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Security boundaries in agentic architectures

Security boundaries in agentic coding architectures require separating trust levels across components that read filesystems, run shell commands, and generate code, as prompt injection can escalate to credential theft.

Feb 24 · · primary fetch1 sourceupdated Feb 24 ·

Most agents today run generated code with full access to your secrets. As more agents adopt coding agent patterns, where they read filesystems, run shell commands, and generate code, they're becoming multi-component systems that each need a different level of trust. While most teams run all of these components in a single security context, because that's how the default tooling works, we recommend thinking about these security boundaries differently. Below we walk through: More agents are adopting the coding agent architecture. These agents read and write to a filesystem. They run bash, Python, or similar programs to explore their environment.

And increasingly, agents generate code to solve particular problems. Even agents that aren't marketed as "coding agents" use code generation as their most flexible tool. A customer support agent that generates and runs SQL to look up account data is using the same pattern, just pointed at a database instead of a filesystem. An agent that can write and execute a script can solve a broader class of problems than one limited to a fixed set of tool calls. Consider an agent debugging a production issue. The agent reads a log file containing a…

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  1. vercel.comSecurity boundaries in agentic architecturesprimary